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HOW MUCH OIL DOES THE USSR rRODUCEl
THE latest figures available on thecrude-oil production of the USSR
are as follows:
In Million Tons
1937 30.0
1938 32.2
1~9 3O~
1940 34.2
Although, on careful examination, these
figures appear to be exaggerated, we
must base our calculations on th(,lll as
no others can be obtained.
Figures on oil production since the
outbreak of the war on June 22, 1941,
are, of course, not available. However,
we can be certain that everything was
done to increase it as much as possible
and in particular to develop the relatively
new oil fields of the "Second Baku. JJ
Considering the well-known shortage in
the Soviet manufacture of high-grade
equipment for oil drilling and refining
and the disturbances due to the outbreak
of the war with Germany, yet allowing
the Soviets the benefit of the doubt, We
may assume that their output in 1941
was at most 37 million tons and during
the first six months of 1942, prior to the
great summer offensive, a maximum of
19 million tons.
Whatever oil the USSR has produced
since the summer of 1941 has remained
within her borders. Even before the war,
her exports had almost ceased. They fell
from 6 million tons in 1932 to about 1.5
million tons in 1938, in spite of the
existing demand abroad. This was ill
part due to the establishment of reserves
for war, but is mainly the consequence of
the widespread use of oil as fuel in in-
dustry and agriculture. According to
Soviet press reports, 60 per cent of the
1940 production of motor fuel was COll-
sumed by tractors, nearly 500,000 of
them operating on the industrialized fa.rms
of the USSR. We may note, incidentally,
that kerosene is the standard cooking fuel
of the population.
CAUCASUS
The main oil fields of the USSH. may
be grouped comprehensively under three
names: Caucasus, Emba, and Ural-Volga.
Up to and including 1940, the Caucasus,
with its three main fields of Baku, Grozny.
and Maikop, supplied 87 per cent of the
total crude-oil production of the USSR,
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which would bring thc production of Cau-
casian oil in 1940 up to about 29,700,000
tons. In 1941 and 1942, of course,
all emphasis was put on the development
of fields other than the Caucasian, partly
because of the danger of losing the
. latter, partly because there were no
means of transporting any more oil
from Baku through the bottleneck of the
transportation system. The various fields
of the Caucasus produced as follows:
CAUCAS\;S OIL PaoDUCTIo~ 1940
Maikop 8 per cent.
Grozny 23 ..
Baku 611 ..
EMDA.
Among the three great oil areas of the
USSR, the Emba fields have the smallest
1 million tons respectively, one carrying
crude oil, the other oil refined in the
Baku plant. These lines run in the deep
valley between the Caucasus proper and
the Transcauca.sus range. Another line
connecting Baku with the Grozny system
was under construction in 1939 and may
be functioning by now.
By rail, Baku is linked both through
Rostov and Stalingrad with the main
Russian trunk system and, via Titlis,
with Batum and Poti on the Black Sea
on the one hand and with Tabriz on the
other. According to recent reports, the
tracks have been extended from Tabriz
to Teheran. Work on a line of more
than 200 miles
from Astrakhan
to Kizlyar and
on to the Mak-
hatch Kalal
Grozny line was
reported in 1941,
but nothing is
known about the
progress of this
work.
More impor-
tant than the
railroads are the
shipping connec-
tions of the Cau-
casus fields. They
are linked by
them across the
Caspian with
Krasnovod s k
(railhead of the
Central Asia rail-
ways), with
Guryev (the
Caspian terminus
of the pipe-line
system of the
Emba area and of the Ural railways)
and, via Astrakhan, with the inland
waterways system of. the Volga,
which allows the movement of river
barges clear across Russia to Leningrad
and the White Sea.
100 per cent'fotal Caucasus
Both Maikop and
Grozny are part
of the North
Caucasus pipe-
line system
shown on our
lllap. The main
line runs from
the Caspian port
of Makhatch
Kala via Grozny
and Ma.ikop to
Tuapse on the
Black Sea. It
has an annual
capacity of 1.7
million tons.
The most im-
portant branch
line leads from
Maikop via
Armavir and
Rostov right into
the Don bass
( Donets - Basin),
the industrial
heart of the
USSR, and ends
at Lisitchansk. Its capacity is also
1.7 million tons. A smaller branch car-
ries crude oil from Maikop to the re-
fineries of Krasnodar.
Baku, on the Apsheron peninsula of
the Ca.spian Sea, one of the richest oil
fields in the world, is connected with
Batum on the Black Sea by two pipe
lines, with an annual capacity of 1.7 amI
'.
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Cauoaaua •• 29.7 •• 29.7
Emba .••••• 1.3
"Second Baku" • . 5.3
Othor areas, 8uch as Sakhalin, etc. 0.7
Caucasian fields, we obtain the following
picture :
PaoBULB 19U OIL PaODUCTION OF TIlE USSR
(in million tons)
Baku •• 20.7
GroXDy •• •• 6.5
Maikop " •• •• 2.5
What has been the effect of the war
on the oil situation of the USSR? Up
to now, the war has had no direct in-
fluence on the output or delivery of oil
from Emba and the "Second Baku."
The Emba/Orsk pipe line is probably
still functioning, as are the railways from
t)rsk and Ufa to Moscow, although they
must be terribly overloaded as both lines
meet in Kuibyshev. But the Caucasus
oil situation has been gravely affected.
First a word about the pipe lines. Last
year, many refineries in the Donbass and
~e Ukraine had already fallen to the
Axis armies, whose progress along the
coasts of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov
and whose occupation of almost the entire
Crimean peninsula had also brought to
a standstill the Bow to the eastem front
of oil brought aCr088 the sea from Batum,
Tuapse, or Novor088yisk. This year's
operations by land, &ea, and air have
continued the prooees, with the result
that the usefulness of the Black Sea. har-
bors as outlets of CaU0UU8 oil to the
Red fo~xcept the Red Navy-may
be said to have ceased. Thus the 2.7
million tons of pipe-line capacity between
Baku and Batum have been practicaUy
obliterated 88 a military factor.
The Jlaikop fields are already in Ger-
man hands. Those of Grozny are threat-
ened and probably by now in a state of
being dismantled in anticipation of their
inevitable 1088. The entire pipe-line and
railway system from the Caucasus to
Russia, with the exceptior1 of the line
Kizlyar/Astrakhan, is gone.
THE lLULWAYS
According to recent British reports,
the railway system of the USSR possesses
production, about 1.3 million tons an-
nually, and are located in the thinly
populated, desert-like Kirgbiz steppes.
But the pipe-line system of this area is
impressive. The main line nms straight
from Guryev on the Caspian to Orsk
and by now perhaps even across the Ural
mountains to Magnitogorsk. It carries
to the industrial areas of the Ural the
output of the Emba area-to whioh it is
connected. by over 150 miles of feeder
lines-as well 8S the Caucasus oil brought
to Guryev by tankers. It was ready in
193R, when the capacity was given as 2
million tons a year. A plan to increase
the capacity of the line to handle I)
million tons a year was mentioned.
Regarding the 8Ucce88 of these plans,
however, we are in the dark.
UJUL-VOLGA
This area comprises the oil fields of
the Bashkir and 7'artar Republics, which
are also known comprehensively as the
"Second Baku," and the most important
of which are at Ishimbayavo, south of Ufa.
According to the Third Five Year Plan,
the annual yield of the "Second Baku"
was supposed by 1942 to reach 21.8 per
cent of the total Soviet production. It
is very unlikely that this has been ac-
complished, as the last figure available,
that for 1941, gave a p~uotion of only
1.6 million tons, a decline from the almost
2 million tons which had been produced
there in 1939.
In view of the extraordinary efforts
which since then have doubtless been put
into the "Second Baku" as the only
reasonably safe oil field of European
Russia, we will assume its production for
1941 to have been 5.3 million tons.
1941 A-"'ID THE WAB
Considering the progress actually
achieved in the former Five Year Plans,
when technical assistance and equipment
were obtained in large quantities from
abroad, and when the country's industrial
organization had not been crippled by the
1088 of important industrial areas as it has
in the past year, and taking into account
that all increase in the output of oil
was probably achieved in other than
USSR Total 37.0
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500.000 tons of tank-car capaoity. Count-
ing a minimum of three weeks for a
round tori p and allowing no time for
repair. these cars could transport 8
million tons a year. Although no figures
are available as to the distribution and
operation of this rolling stock. the follow-
ing considerations naturally oome to
mind. The traffic density of the rail-
ways of the USSR, even before the
present war. was the highest in the
world. In 1940. Soviet railways hauled
4.3 million tons of freight per kilometer
of track. as against 0.94 million tons for
the United States. While the capacity
of the rolling stock at that date was three
times that of 1913. the load carried was
five times as great.
Except. perhaps. for some of the
timber. all the freight hauled was in-
dispensable-that is to say. it could not
be reduced without a corresponding let-
down at some point of the country's
economic structure. This. then. was also
the situation of the railways connecting
the Caucasus with the R11lI8ian trunk
aystem when. as a result of the advance
of the European armies. they came
within the immediate line of communica-
tion area of the Soviet battle front.
Thenceforth. these already overstrained
rnilways had not only to provide for the
movement of whole armies and their
supplies but also to bear the brunt of
direct and devastating attacks of the
Luftwaffe. Considering the length of
time this situation has lasted. it seems
safe to conclude that the average daily
load of oil carried northward by these
railways has fallen well below the pre-
war figure. And as for the period since
the beginning of the European summer
offensive of 1942. all direct rail connec-
tions between the Caucasus and the rest
of the USBR. with the sole exception of
the Kizlyar I Astrakhan 1Neu Urbach 1
Saratov line, have been cut.
THE CRUX OJ' TJDI lIU.'1'TEB.
Hence the crux of the matter lies with
shipping. A very substantial load of oil
supplies from the Caucasus for domestic
consumption has been carried by the
river tanker fleet. with an estimated
capacity of 600.000 tons, operating on the
Caspian Sea and the Volga water system.
The network of rivers and connecting
canals enabled this Beet to distribute the
oil over a large section of European
Russia. but winter restricts the activitv
of river tankers to little more than haif
a year. Counting an average of six
weeks for the round trip and a navigation
period of seven months, they probably
carried around 5 to 6 million tons an-
nually, The fact that, like all other
transportation in the USSR, the tanker
fleet has always operated at full capacity,
and that the particularly severe winter of
1941/42 lasted longer than usual, does
not suggest the probability that the
quantity of oil carried by this means in
the past fifteen months can have been
greater than usual, notwithstanding the
fact that the transport itself up to the
end of July has been immune from direct
attacks.
The German approach toward Stalin-
grad gravely endangers the U8Cfulness of
Russia's most important waterway, the
Volga. as a carrier of Caucasus oil. Once
in Stalingrad or at any other point along
the river. the Germans could completely
stop the Volga-bome supply of Caucasus
oil to the central and northem parts of
the USSR. This would leave only the
railways Kizlyar/AstrakhanfNeu Urbach
and Guryev/Uralsk and the waterway
of the Ural River, which latter is very
unsatisfactory as it is not linked with the
main system of Soviet waterways and
requires further transport again by the
overworked railway system. Incidentally,
even in time of peace the Volga is closed
by ice many months every year; in its
middle course. navigation is only possible
for an average of 1~0 days a year.
BBASONS FOB DOtTBT
Having considered the various means of
transportation available for Soviet oil,
we can give the reasons for our skepticism
with regard to Soviet statistics. Accord-
ing to Soviet figures, the total oil produc-
tion in 1940 was 34.2 million tons. The
Caucasus with its 87-per-cent quota
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oil situation of the USSR must be reck-
oned potential rather than actual, be-
cause the available excess cannot be
brought to those places where it is needed.
(3) The huge quantity of oil required
by the highly mechanized Soviet military
machine has been drawn increasingly
from reserves beyond the bottleneck of
the Caucasus transport system, as also
from supplies earmarked for the needs of
industrial production or the people's
livelihood. Robbing any of these must.
lead to eventual exhaustion of the phys-
ical power to resist.
(4) The course of the fronte at the
present time has reduced the once mighty
flood of oil reaching European Russia
from the Caucasus to a modest trickle
flowing over the following routes :
Volga River (although under the
hail of German bombers)
AstrakhanfNeu Urbach railway
GuryevfUralsk railway
(6) If we assume that in 1940 some-
31 million tons of oil were available to
the European part of the USSR, the
annual amount of oil actually reaching it
on the basis of the present front line, has,
probably dwindled down to the follow-
ing:
would thus have produced 29.i, or
roughly 30 million tons. What means
were available for the transportation of
this amount to the industrial centers of
the USSR? Taking all available Soviet
data into account, we obtain approxima,te-
ly the following picture:
TRA1'fSPOUAnON or CAUC4lItAS OIL n; 1940
(in million tons)
By pipe line to Batum and Tuap80 and on
by boa~ AC1'OII8 tho Black Se. . . . . 4.4
By piee line Armavir/Donbue " .• •. 1.7
By nul via Rosto~·. Stalingrad. or Astrakhan 6.0
B~' t.nker from Baku or Makh.teh Kala
Be"*' the Caspian Sea to the Volga water
system ........•••.•. 6.6
By tanker from Baku or Makhateh Kala to
Guryn and on by pipe line. rail, or boa~ 0.9
B~' tanker from Baku~ the CupiaD Sea
to Kra811ovodsk and 011 by nil t,o Central
Asia " " .. •. 0.6
MiacellaneouB • • • • • • • • 1.0
Total.. .• •. 20.0
Checking these figures, it appears im-
poesible that more than 20 million tons
could have been transported, while 30
million were supposedly produced. Even
if we take into consideration the loss in
bulk by refining as well as the local
needs of oil in the Caucasus itself, it
seems absurd to assume that millions of
tons more were produced than could be
shipped. Having more confidence in the
transportation figures than in the produc-
tion figures, nothing is left but to assume
that the figures for the oil production of
the USSR are considerably padded. From the "Second Baku"From the Emba fields •.
From the Caueuus
In Tons
.. 6.000,000
1.000,000
3,600,000
CONCLUSIONS
We arrive at the following conclusions:
(1) The output of the Caucasus is
8till by far the preponderant factor in
the ~il production of the USSR.
(2) On account of the transport situa-
tion of the area, the quantity of Cau088U8
oil which has reached ite destination in
the USSR in the past fifteen months is
likely to have decreased in a substantial
measure. Thus, although the occupation
of large territories of the
USSR by the Axis armies
has released the quantity of
oil formerly required by
these territories, the corre-
sponding improvement in the
N_ oil production available in tho
European USSR annually •• • • 9,600,000
(6) Some of the most important re-
fineries of the U~R are already under
German control (Odeaa. Kherson. Berd-
yanak. Lisitohanak, Krasnodar); others.
(Stalingrad. Grozny) are threatened and
probably not in use.
As no substantial help can be expected
from Moscow's foreign allies in view of
their own tanker situation, and 8S a.
large part of the oil reserves
was probably used up in the
past fifteen months of war,
the lack of oil will prove one
of the most dangerous shack-
les of the Red Army.
